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This article  provides  an empirical description  of  the complete Dutch 
audit market from its inception, in the late nineteenth century, to the 
present day. Specifically, it documents the development of  the structure of 
the Dutch audit industry in terms of  the number of  audit firms and the 
audit  firm size  distribution.  The audit  firm size measure used  is  the 
number of  auditors affiliated with an audit firm. Central in the collection 
of  the  audit  firm  data  are  the  membership  lists  of  Dutch  auditor 
associations.  These,  with  additional  information  from Dutch financial 
directories, permit the calculation, with two-year intervals, of  the size of 
each existing audit firm with the number of  auditors as firm-size measure. 
The data so obtained give the opportunity to extend existing research on 
audit market concentration. The level of  concentration in the Dutch audit 
market is determined over a long period, at a large number of  points in 
time. The results show concentration levels that are low and stable for a 
long period.  Only in the past two decades have these levels increased 
substantially. Potential  explanations for this pattern are:  (a) increasing 
regulation of  the demand side of  the Dutch audit market, (b) increasing 
technological  complexity  of  the audit process,  (c) increasing  (interna- 
tional) client concentration, and (d) mergers of  the international affiliates 
of  the Dutch audit firms. The article concludes that auditor association 
membership lists provide a rich data set and create other opportunities 
for further historical audit (market) research. 
Key words:  Audit; Concentration; History. 
Professional organizations of  auditors have many important functions, one of which 
-  little noted  in  research so far -  is  that  they  usually  provide lists of  their 
membership with regular intervals. These lists of  members are rich sources of  data 
for studies of  the development of  audit markets. Remarkably, however, these lists 
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have hardly been used in audit market research. Maijoor (1994) is  an exception, 
although only auditor-level data were used. This article uses membership lists to 
generate and study audit firm-level data. 
There are some clear benefits of using membership lists. First, they might contain 
data that allow a view of the complete audit market at a given point in time, and of its 
development through time. Previous audit market studies using audit-fee and/or 
client-data focus on the larger audit firms and larger clients because audit fees and 
client data are only  available for such firms and clients. The demand for audit 
services by smaller clients, and the supply by smaller audit firms, is neglected in these 
studies. Also, studies using audit-fee andor client-data for truncated samples of 
larger firms  seldom  contain  information on, for  instance, entry  by  audit firms 
(because entering audit firms are in  general small). Yet  the level of  entry is  an 
important characteristic of  a market. Second, because membership lists are more 
easily available than audit fee and/or client data, especially for earlier periods, these 
lists give the opportunity to obtain information on audit market characteristics for 
longer periods, for more points in time and for more countries. 
In this article, membership lists will be used to address the issue of  concentration 
in the Dutch audit market and its evolution. In 1990 there were 505 audit firms in the 
Netherlands, with a total of  2,770 afliliated Dutch auditors, and which generated 
total sales of  Dfl 3.3 billion (about US$1.65  billion; See Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek, 1992). The four largest audit firms accounted for about 60  per cent of  total 
audit market sales (Meuwissen, 1992), and this relatively high degree of  market 
share concentration has raised concerns about the competitiveness of  the Dutch 
audit market (see, e.g., Langendijk and Deetman, 1990). High supply-side concen- 
tration is also common in audit markets in other countries, and has raised similar 
concerns. For example, the European Community has commissioned research to 
assess the level of  competition in the audit markets in member countries (NERA, 
1992). Other studies providing evidence on concentration levels in audit markets 
include Moizer and Turley (1989) on the U.K. audit market and Tomczyck and Read 
(1989) with results for the U.S. 
The structure of  the Dutch audit market is the result of  a long-term process of 
audit firms entering and exiting the market, internal growth of  firms, and mergers 
between them. Some of  the larger current firms had their origins in the nineteenth 
century, but there are few data bases on their history. Such data bases would expand 
the current body of research in this area and create opportunities for a type of  audit 
market research that, as yet, hardly exists (Previts et al.,  1990b). 
The article provides three major contributions. First, to explain and test theories 
about the factors shaping the structure of  the Dutch audit market, data describing 
the long-term history of  audit firms will be expected to be useful. In this article a first 
attempt is made to explain observed changes in that market. Second, and related to 
the first, the data allow an examination of  the effects of  regulation on the structure of 
the Dutch audit market. Hence, research on the history of audit firms and markets in 
Holland  is  relevant  for  the  formulation of  audit  market  policy  generally  and, 
specifically,  its likely impact on audit market functioning (Previts et al., 1990a). Third, 
this article is a response to the observation that historical accounting and auditing 
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research are increasingly limited to practices in English-speaking countries (Parker, 
1993,  p. 108). 
Audit  market  concentration measurement  has  already  received  considerable 
attention  in  the  audit  research  literature  and  developments  in  the  level  of 
concentration are documented in many studies (see, e.g., Zeff  and Fossum, 1967; 
Schiff  and Fried, 1976; Gilling and  Stanton, 1978;  Dopuch and Simunic, 1980). 
However, membership list data provide an opportunity to calculate concentration 
indices over a longer period, at more points in time, and for a (nearly) complete 
audit  market.  Hence,  this  study  substantially extends  existing  audit  market 
concentration research. 
Audit market concentration is only one research issue that may benefit from the 
use of  membership list data; many  other  audit market  research topics can be 
addressed with these data. Two other examples, albeit related, are: (a) the factors 
that drive the demand for audit services; and (b) successful growth strategies of  audit 
filXlS. 
MEASUREMENT OF  AUDIT FIRM SIZE AND AUDIT MARKET 
STRUCTURE 
Audit Firm Size Measurement 
To measure the size of  an audit firm, we rely on the number of  affiliated auditors, 
either as an employee or as a partner. Arguably, audit-fee income would provide a 
‘better’ firm size measure than  data on the number of  auditors. However, such 
income was, and to a large extent remains, unobservable; certainly in the Dutch 
audit market. Thus, audit firm size in terms of  audit fee-income can be conveniently 
proxied  by  the  number  of  auditors  affiliated with  firms.  There  are  two  main 
arguments for using this proxy. 
First, assuming that  audit firm size is not  directly observable and cannot be 
measured objectively, fee income can be viewed as a proxy of firm size. There is no 
Q priori reason to expect that fee-income is a better proxy of  audit firm  size than a 
headcount measure. A further argument in favour of  the headcount measure is that 
the employment of auditors makes an audit firm a player in the audit market. 
Second, as labour is the major production factor in the audit industry, it is likely 
that the number of  partners and employed auditors is directly related to an audit 
firm’s size and fee-income. Differences in efficiency and technology between firms 
and over time might also affect this relationship, but empirical research reports high 
correlations  between  the  two  measures.  Meuwissen  (1992)  presents  these 
correlations for the Netherlands for a number of  recent years (i.e., 1986, 1988 and 
1990) and for firms for which data on both fee income and number of  auditors are 
available. Correlation measures are calculated for both total fee income and audit 
fee income; all being higher than 0.970. A study on the Canadian audit industry by 
Zind and Eghal (1989) also shows high correlations between headcount measures 
and audit fee-income. 
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Note also that proxying firm size by an employment measure is well-established in 
studies of  (the evolution of) measured market structure in other industries. This 
holds in both industrial organization (see, e.g., Dunne et al., 1989) and organization 
studies (see, e.g., Briiderl and Schiissler, 1990). Again, the general result is that the 
employment-sales correlation is nearly perfect (see, e.g., Boone and De Brabander, 
1993). 
Audit Market Structure Measurement 
To  measure supply-side concentration, this study employs two measures that are 
generally used in audit market concentration studies and also in the general field of 
industrial organization (for an overview see, e.g.,  Schmalensee, 1989). The two 
measures are the concentration ratio Cn and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (H- 
index). Both are briefly introduced below. 
An n-firm concentration ratio is defined as the market share of the largest n firms 
in  an industry. A  conventional number for n is  4. The formula to calculate the 
concentration ratio is 
n 
i=  1 
cn  =  I:  si, 
where Si is the market share of  firm i. Hence, Cn is the cumulative market share of 
the n largest firms in the industry at a given point in time. Obviously, Cn  does not 
capture information on the size distribution of  firms that do not belong to the largest 
n firms. The maximum value of  Cn is one. The higher the value of  Cn,  the more 
unequal is the industry’s firm size distribution and so the higher is the supply-side 
concentration. 
The H-index is based on the summed squared market shares of  all firms in an 
industry at a given point in time. Its value is between 0 and 1. The nearer to 1, the 
more unequal is an industry’s size distribution and the higher is the level of  supply- 
side concentration. The H-index is defined as 
N 
i=  1 
H  =  I:  Sf, 
where N refers to the total number of firms in an industry. Note that the H-index is a 
weighted sum of market shares, where the weights are the market shares themselves. 
This weighting scheme implies that smaller firms influence the H-index to a lesser 
extent than large ones. The H-index is  sensitive to both the number of  firms in the 
market and the variation in the firms’ market shares. 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY LONG PERIOD, MANY 
MEASUREMENT POINTS, AND COMPLETE MARKET 
In the  audit market  literature  supply-side concentration is considered to  be  an 
important indicator of  competitive behaviour (see, e.g., Dopuch and Simunic, 1980; 
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Moizer and Turley, 1989). Since the pioneering study of  Zeff  and Fossum (1967), 
many studies have tried to measure supply-side concentration of  audit markets. 
However, compared with this study they cover shorter time periods, concentration is 
measured at fewer points in time, and concentration is only calculated for a subset of 
the audit market (i.e., only larger audit firms are included). 
Danos  and  Eichenseher  (1986)  study  the  US. audit  market  concentration 
measurement over the longest period of  time (1950-80).  Most other studies cover 
shorter time periods, generally restricted to a subset within the past two decades. 
The Danos and Eichenseher study also goes back the furthest in time. 
Within the periods covered by the audit market concentration studies, concen- 
tration  is  only  measured  at  a  few  points  in  time.  For  example, Danos  and 
Eichenseher (1986) report concentration levels at four points. Tomczyck and Read 
(1989) has the largest number of  observations over time, measuring concentration in 
the US.  audit market in each year of the five-year period 1983-87. 
Concerning the audit market samples included in concentration studies, all studies 
examine a subset of  the supply side of  the audit market. Only audit firms that serve 
larger clients or clients listed on the relevant stock exchange are included. This is 
because audit-firm size is in general measured on the basis of  client data such as 
assets, revenues and market  value. For  larger and listed  clients, these data are 
frequently readily available. The studies by Tomczyck and Read (1989) and Zind 
and ZCghal(l989) do not use client data, but directly measure the fees of audit firms. 
However, again only larger audit firms are included in the sample. Against this, the 
current study goes back to 1880 and measures concentration with approximately 
two-year intervals for the (nearly) complete audit market. 
Additionally, interest in long-term longitudinal studies into the historical evolution 
of industries is expressed by industrial organization and organization studies scholars 
(see, e.g.,  Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Carroll and Hannan, 1989). This type of 
longitudinal research -  covering the complete history of  an industry on the basis of 
a large number of  measurement points -  is extremely valuable, as it permits the 
search for causal explanations of  long-term competitive processes without the flaws 
implied by sample bias. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Data were collected from three main data source categories: (a) membership lists of 
all auditor associations which eventually merged into the current Dutch association 
for auditors, Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants (NIvRA); (b) national 
Dutch financial directories and financial directories of  Dutch cities; and (c) other 
data  sources such as histories of  individual audit firms and journals of  auditor 
associations. These categories of  data sources are discussed below. A more detailed 
description of  the data collection process is given in Buijink et al. (1993). 
Membership lists of Dutch auditor associations are convenient for providing the 
required data because these, (a) have been published ever since the founding of 
auditor associations, and (b), often contain detailed information on auditors and, 
after 1920, the audit firms to which they belong. Appendix A gives a genealogy of  the 
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NIvRA and its preceding associations. The other Dutch professional organization of 
accountants,  Nederlandse  Orde  van  Accountants-Administratieconsulenten 
(NOvAA) and its preceding associations are not  included in  this study and are 
therefore not depicted in the genealogy. NOvAA members provide mainly review, 
compilation and tax services to small businesses. In 1993, they also received the right 
to provide audit services. 
Membership lists generally provide the  following auditor  information: name, 
address, education, industry (whether an auditor is  active in public practice or in 
other industries) and level (whether the auditor is partner or employee of  the firm). 
After 1920 the membership lists contain data on the audit firms where members of 
the association work, comprising the name and address of the audit firm plus a list of 
affiliated auditors. 
Financial directories also provide information relating to auditors and audit firms. 
There are two types of  directories: national directories and directories for individual 
Dutch  cities.  The  information is  often  less detailed  than  in  membership lists. 
National directories provide the name and address of  all Dutch auditors who are 
members of  an auditor association. They also often list the name and address of 
Dutch audit firms with more than one auditor (though not for the years prior to 
1899). Unfortunately, the national directories often fail to provide the names of audit 
firms with only one auditor. 
City directories include the names of  large audit firms located in the city. They also 
include an alphabetical list of  the name and job of  all city  inhabitants, thereby 
enabling determination of  the names of  all auditors living in  that city and their 
occupation (i.e., whether they are active in public practice or in other industries). If 
auditors are employed by  an audit firm with more than one auditor, the auditors’ 
names are also included in the audit firm lists in the national directories. If  an auditor 
works in  public practice according to the city directory, but is not included in the 
national directories, he is classified as a sole-practitioner. Hence, the national and 
city financial directories provide complementary information. 
The final category of  data sources used are books and articles about audit firms 
and auditor associations, annual reports of auditor associations, minutes of meetings 
of  such associations, and their professional journals. For example, de Vries (1985) is 
a  detailed description of  the  Dutch  audit history in  the  1895-1935  period, and 
Metzemaekers and van Maastrigt (1983) and Sluyterman (1993) present the history 
of the pioneering Dutch audit firm Moret & Limperg. 
To give an indication of  the extensiveness of  the data material collected, Table 1 
gives a  numerical  overview of  the  data  sources consulted for  this  article. The 
overview makes a distinction between the three categories identified above. As 
shown, 224 membership lists were used plus 179 financial directories and 362 other 
publications. Hence, 765 archival pieces were accessed. More precise information on 
the titles of  the  materials involved, their year of  publication and their physical 
location is given in Buijink et al. (1993). 
Three time periods can be distinguished in terms of  the relevance of  those data 
sources, and thereby the implied degree of  completeness of  the data set: pre-1895, 
1895-1920  and 1920-1990.  Note that missing data is not a serious problem for at least 
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TABLE  1 
NUMERICAL OVERVIEW OF DATA SOURCES, 188&1990 
Data source  Number 
Membership lists 
Nationale Organisatie van Accountants 
Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants 
Nederlandsch College van Accountants 
Nederlandsch Genootschap van Accountants 
Nederlandsch Instituut van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Academie van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Accountants Associatie 
Nederlandsche Accountants Vereeniging 
Nederlandsche Associatie van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Bond van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Broederschap van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Organisatie van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Unie van Accountants 
Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Accountants 
































Other data sources 
Books and articles about audit firms and auditor associations 
Annual reports of  auditor associations 
Minutes of  auditor association meetings 







two reasons. First, the calculation of  the C,-ratio requires size measures of  the four 
largest hs  only, whereas in all likelihood all missing firms are small. Second,  for the 
years where the data set is complete the correlation between the C,-ratio  and the 
H-index proves to be (nearly) perfect. The data collection process for each of  these 
three periods is discussed in more detail below, and summary tables with the data for 
these three periods are also given. 
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Pre-1895 
The first independent auditor’s signature to appear below the financial statements of 
a company in the Netherlands was that of  B. F.  van Ysselstein (Metzemaekers and 
van  Maastrigt, 1983, p.  53), the  year being  1879 and the company the Nieuwe 
Afrikaansche  Handelsch  Vereeniging  in  Rotterdam.  The  first  Dutch  auditor 
association, Nederlandsch Instituut van Accountants (NIvA), was founded sixteen 
years later in 1895. 
In contrast to the early years of  the accounting profession in other countries such 
as the United Kingdom, little bankruptcy and insolvency work was undertaken by 
Dutch auditors, who had no legal function in bankruptcy and insolvency procedures. 
In the Netherlands, demand for auditors had its origin in a demand for audited 
financial statements. The largest part of  the work of  Dutch auditors has always 
consisted of  auditing (see, e.g.,  Brown, 1968, p.  287; and Zeff  et al., 1992, p.  14). 
However, it should be noted that a number of  bankruptcy cases clearly showed a 
need by  investors to monitor the performance of  companies by  means of  audited 
financial statements  (de  Vries  1985, p.  34;  Brandenburg,  1993, p.  13). Hence, 
bankruptcy cases indirectly stimulated the demand for audit services. 
For this period, without the publication of  auditor association membership lists, 
the following strategy was pursued to gather data on the number and size of  audit 
firms. A list was compiled with the names of  all auditors in the first (1895) NIvA 
membership list. Names were traced backward in time in the financial directories of 
the four largest (in terms of auditors living there) Dutch cities. Audit firm affiliation 
of  the auditors found in these directories was then used to construct an audit firm 
name and size list for the period up to 1895. This was  done on a bi-annual basis. 
From the data in Appendix B we estimate that for 1880-95  the data set covers about 
80 per cent of  the audit market in terms of  the number of  auditors. As far as audit 
firms are concerned, it is likely that the coverage is complete for the period 188&88, 
whereas for the years 189&94 about 30 per cent of  the audit firms are estimated to 
be missing. 
The results on the number and size of  audit firms for the period 1880-94  are given 
in Table 2. Not surprisingly, in its infancy the Dutch audit industry comprised a small 
number of  auditors (2 in 1880 to 16 in 1894) employed by a small number of  audit 
firms (1 in 1884 to 8 in 1894) associated with a high relative net entry figure (-1 in 
1884 to 3 in 1890). The first audit firm employing more than one auditor was founded 
on  1 January  1883  (de  Vries,  1985, p.  36).  Its  name  was  the  Bureel  voor 
Boekhouding. A few years later Confidentia was added. Other early audit firms were 
Silentium and Bureau  voor Boekhouden Vertrouwen. Interestingly, Confidentia 
grew to become the Moret, Ernst & Young giant. Silentium became the audit firm of 
Burgmans that was  taken over by  Frese, Hogeweg, Meyer & Horchner in  1964, 
which in its turn merged into one of the market leaders, KPMG Klynveld. 
1895-1 920 
In principle, collection of  data for the 1895-1920  period should have been easier, 
provided that auditor association membership lists give the audit firm affiliation of 
their  members in  public practice.  This  proved  not  to be  the  case  until  1921. 
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TABLE  2 
NUMBER AND SIZE OF AUDIT FIRMS IN THE NETHERLANDS, 188&94 
Year  Total number  Number of  Mean  Maximum  Net 
of auditors  audit firms  size"  Size"  entry 
1880  2  2  1  .oo  1  2 
1882  2  2  1  .oo  1  0 
1884  5  1  5.00  5  -1 
1886  6  2  3.00  5  1 
1888  6  2  3  .00  5  0 
1890  10  5  2.00  5  3 
1892  11  6  1.83  5  1 
1894  16  8  2.00  5  2 
Audit firm size is measured in terms of total number of  auditors affiliated with the firm. 
Therefore, the same data collection strategy as for the pre-1895 period was pursued. 
However,  there  is  the  added  convenience that  it  is  now  possible  to  combine 
information in  annual membership lists with data in directories. Again, data are 
collected on a bi-annual basis. In this period, as in the earlier one, only auditors living 
in the four largest Dutch cities were considered. In addition, information from all the 
available  auditor  association  lists  was  taken  into  consideration. The  data  in 
Appendix B reveal the estimate that this procedure captures 66 per cent (in 1903) to 
83 per cent (in 1908) of  the audit market in terms of the number of  auditors, and 61 
per cent (in 1901) to 80 per cent (in 1908) of  the number of  audit firms. 
The results on the number and size of  audit firms in the period from 1895 to 1920 
are presented in Table 3. After the founding of  NIvA in 1895, the number of  audit 
firms increased sharply (from 23 in 1896 to 160 in 1920). A likely reason is that in the 
first years of its existence, the executive committee of  NIvA worked hard to make 
the services of  its members more widely known. For example, they contacted newly 
established companies and recommended the hiring of  an auditor (de Vries, 1985, 
p. 47). Also, the membership lists of  NIvA were mailed to potential clients among 
existing companies. At the same time, NIvA had a loose policy in terms of  new 
members entering the organization. In the first years, individuals could enter without 
a formal examination (de Vries, 1985, pp. 42-8). 
Hence,  the  founding of  NIvA  started  the  process  of  developing an  audit 
profession, which produced an uninterrupted increase in the number of  professional 
auditors (from 32 in 1896 to 213 in 1920). The number of  audit firms also continued 
to grow, being associated with high levels of net entry (up to 26 in 1916). Especially 
towards the end of  this period, and after the First World War, the number of audit 
firms increased. Possibly this was due to the introduction of  the first business income 
tax law in 1915 in the Netherlands. Note that tax consultancy as a profession did not 
yet exist (de Vries, 1985). 
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TABLE  3 
NUMBER AND SIZE OF AUDIT FIRMS IN THE NETHERLANDS, 1896-1920 
Year  Total number  Number of  Mean  Maximum  Net 















































































a Audit firm size is measured in terms of  total number of auditors affiliated with the firm. 
1921-90 
For  the  post-1921 period  data  collection became  easier  as  auditor  association 
membership lists contain the audit firm affiliation for members active in  public 
practice. Unfortunately not all membership lists of  all  Dutch auditor associations 
could be traced; gaps in the data remain, particularly in the 1928-1934  period (with a 
percentage of  51 up to 58 of  the number of  auditors being included in the data set, 
and 44  to 48 per cent of  the number of audit firms). In any  case, all NIvA, 'Bond' and 
VAGA members (VAGA after 1934) are included, and all firms with more than two 
auditors. The data base is complete for the period 1967-90.  Appendix B indicates 
that the data set is  nearly complete for the years 1937-66 in terms of  both auditors 
(covering 68 to 93 per cent of the market) and audit firms (including 59 to 78 per cent 
of  the market). 
The results on the number and size of  audit firms in the period 1921-90  are given 
in Table 4. In these years the number of  audit firms rose until 1947 (from 131 in 1921 
to 288 in 1947). After 1947 the numbers fluctuated until 1974 (with a peak of  350 
firms in 1968 and a minimum of  265 firms in 1974), after which the number has been 
growing until 1990 (to a level of  505 firms). The average size of  audit firms also grew 
until 1975, but thereafter fluctuated. In 1990 the average size lay between the 1971 
and 1972 levels. The maximum size has grown almost every year. Especially between 
1988 and 1990 this growth rate has been substantial (from a maximum of 393 to 524 
affiliated auditors), explained by the large mergers occurring in that period. As far as 
net entry is concerned, a workable distinction can be made between the 1921-60, 
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TABLE  4 
NUMBER AND  SIZE OF AUDIT FIRMS IN THE NETHERLANDS, 1921-90 
Year  Total number  Number of  Mean  Maximum  Net 
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TABLE  4 (contd) 
a Audit firm size is measured in terms of  total number of auditors affiliated with the firm. 
This large negative net entry level is caused by the fact that after 1920 only audit firms are included with 
members who belonged to the NIvA or Nederlandsche Bond van Accountants. This is caused by  data 
restrictions. 
Net entry is high due to the initial inclusion of  audit firms with auditors who were members of  the 
Nederlandsche Organisatie van Accountants. Before 1937 these audit firms are not included due to data 
restrictions. 
Net entry is high due to the initial inclusion of  audit firms with auditors who were members of  the 
Nederlandsche Broederschap van Accountants or Nederlandsche Unie van Accountants. Before 1968 
these audit firms are not included due to data restrictions. 
1960-74  and 1974-90  periods. Net entry is positive in the first and the third periods, 
but negative in the second one. In the first period the net entry figure fluctuated. In 
the second period there were many mergers resulting in negative net entry. In the 
last period net entry is much higher compared with previous periods. 
RESULTS: LONG-TERM CONCENTRATION IN THE DUTCH 
AUDIT MARKET 
This section presents the results of  the descriptive statistics of  the evolution of  the 
supply-side concentration levels in the Dutch audit market from 1880 to 1990. As 
noted, compared to previous audit market concentration research this study covers a 
much longer time period, measures concentration at more points in time, and covers 
the (nearly) complete audit market. 
Potential explanations for observed changes in the level of  concentration include: 
changing economies of  scale in the production of  audit services, more significant 
barriers to enter the audit market, and mergers of  the international networks of 
Dutch  audit firms. Economies of  scale in  audit  markets  might  be  affected  by 
regulation, audit  technology  and  client  concentration. Although  important,  the 
explanations serve illustrative purposes only. Future research will require more in- 
depth  analysis  of  many  potential  explanatory variables.  Before  examining our 
explanations, three figures are presented that summarize the most important data 
from the tables presented in the previous section. 
Figure 1  gives the total number of  auditors active in public practice for the whole 
period under study. The number of  auditors active in public practice may increase as 
a result of  the entry by newly certified or licensed auditors and by auditors switching 
to auditing from other industries.  The number of auditors may decrease as a result of 
auditors  switching  from  public  practice  to  other  industries,  or  of  expulsion, 
retirement and death. As Figure 1  shows, the total number of  auditors in public 
practice increased almost every year. 
Figure 2 shows the total number of  audit firms for the period under examination. 
We included all audit firms with one or more affiliated auditors being a member of an 
auditor association. The number of  audit firms may have grown as a result of  entry 
by new audit firms, while it may have declined as a result of  the exit of  audit firms. 
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Modes of  entry are spin-offs from existing firms, auditors from other industries 
starting a firm in the audit industry, and newly certified auditors starting an audit 
firm; those of exit are the retirement of  all auditors of  the firm, all auditors moving to 
other firms, and acquisition by another audit firm. 
The total number of  audit firms grew from the inception of  the industry up until 
1990,  with few interruptions. Given the nearly continuous growth in the total number 
of  auditors documented in Figure 1, a reduction in the number of  audit firms goes 
hand in hand with increasing concentration. The interruption in the period 1968-74 
is associated with high merger activity, which induced the exit of  the merger partners. 
In this period the Dutch Big Five firms were formed by mergers of  about forty-five 
firms.l The growth of  the total number of  audit firms after 1974 resulted from the 
entry of a large number of small audit firms. 
Figure 3 shows the net entry of  audit firms during the period under study and 
reveals the underlying changes in  the  level of  the total number  of  audit firms 
depicted in Figure 2. Prior to 1962 net entry was nearly always positive. Thereafter 
net entry is negative up to and including 1974. This is mainly caused by the formation 
These  five  firms were  Klynveld  Kraayenhof  &  Co,  Moret  &Limperg,  Dijker  &  Doornbosl 
register-accountants,  Nederlandse Accountants Maatschap, and Van Dien & Co. 
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of  the Dutch Big-Five firms and the resulting merger exits. Beginning in 1975, net 
entry is increasingly positive. Net entry by small audit firms is especially high in the 
1980s. A  potential  explanation for  this  is  the enforcement of  regulation which 
required small- and medium-sized firms to disclose and audit financial statements. 
This regulation was the result of  the Fourth European Directive, which was enforced 
in 1984. The total number of  financial statements disclosed by companies increased 
from 2,883 in 1982 to 68,100 in 1987 (Maijoor, 1991, p. 173). The demand by small 
auditees induced by regulatory measures may have increased the opportunities for 
small firms to supply services. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the evolution of  the C,-ratio  and H-index measures. Not 
surprisingly, the two measures show similar patterns. As a result of  the low number 
of  firms in the industry's infancy, both measures have high values at the beginning of 
the period under study. After 1888 the size of the measures decline rapidly as a result 
of  the growing number  of  audit firms. From  1906 until  1960 the  concentration 
measures are remarkably stable. The sharp increases in concentration levels in the 
1960s and early 1970s clearly reflect the formation of the Dutch Big-Five firms. 
As the figures show, in the period 1988-90  there is again an increase in the level of 
concentration. This occurs despite the fact that there is a high net entry level in this 
period (Figure 3). The total number of  audit firms increased by fifty-seven in this 
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period. As noted in the second section, the H-index is sensitive to both the number 
of  audit firms and the size variance of  firms. The significant increase in the size 
variance is explicable by  the mergers of  five large audit firms into three large firms. 
An  exemplary  merger  in  this  period  involved  the  two  giant  firms  Dijker  & 
Doornbos/ register-accountants  and Van Dien & Co? 
A benchmark for the level of concentration in the Dutch audit market exists in the 
limited  data  about  concentration  levels for  audit  markets in  other  (European) 
countries? Using the square root of  net turnover of  clients to proxy audit fee, Loft 
and  Sjofors (1993)  report  a  1990  C,-ratio  of  0.200  for  Sweden and  0.262  for 
Denmark. Moizer and Turley (1987) report concentration levels for the U.K. audit 
FIGURE  3 
NET ENTRY BY FIRMS IN THE DUTCH AUDIT MARKET, 1880-1990 
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Note. For the years that net entry was affected  by a change in the membership lists that are available (i.e., 
1921,1937,  and 1968, see Table 4), net entry is estimated by the average of  the results for the previous 
period and the next period. 
* The new name after the merger was Deloitte Dijker Van Dien. 
The NERA report on competition in member countries of the EC provides concentration indices for 
all EC member countries. However, these concentration figures are based only on the part of the 
audit market serviced by the largest, mostly Big Six,  audit firms. Because our data are based on the 
complete audit market, it is not valid to use them as a benchmark. 
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market, using three measures of audit fee. When audit fee is measured on the basis 
of  the square root of  client's sales, the C,-ratio is 0.416 for 1972, and 0.492 for 1982. 
These results are lower than the results for the Dutch audit market for 1972 (0.490), 
1982 (0.527) and 1990 (0.587). However, it should be noted that these other studies 
use a different measure for audit firm fee, and do not take the complete audit market 
into account. If  they had covered the compIete audit market, the difference with our 
results would have been larger. 
Three major explanations for increasing concentration are suggested in the audit 
market literature: (a) an increase of  audit firm size as a result of  more pronounced 
economies of  scale in the production of  audit services; (b) a reduction in the number 
of  firms entering the audit market as a result of  more significant entry barriers; and 
(c) the mergers of  national audit firms induced by the mergers of  their international 
networks. 
FIGURE  4 
THE FOUR-FIRM  CONCENTRATION RATIO (C,) FOR THE DUTCH AUDIT MARKET, 
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Note.  For the period prior to 1986 the H-index is not presented. As a result of  the infancy stage of  the 
audit industry, the number of  firms is very low and the value for the H-index very high. 
More Pronounced Production Economies of  Scale 
Concerning the first explanation, more pronounced production economies of  scale 
would result in a larger, efficient audit firm size, implying that concentration can be 
expected to increase. This explanation assumes competitive (or contestable) audit 
markets -  that is, audit firms need to adjust their size to the efficient scale in order 
'to survive (Baumol, 1982). Three main factors have been proposed as likely to affect 
economies of  scale in the public accounting sector: financial accounting regulation, 
audit  technology  and  client  concentration  (see  Eichenseher  and  Danos,  1981; 
Yardley et al.,  1992). 
More  complex  financial  accounting  regulation  requires  substantial  sunk 
investment in expertise. Without a minimum level of  investment in expertise on 
financial accounting regulations, audit services cannot be  provided.  Hence, the 
advent of  greater regulation and the subsequent need for sunk expertise would 
increase the efficient size of  an audit firm. In the Nertherlands the first substantial 
financial accounting regulation was introduced in 1971  (for an extensive  discussion of 
the development of  this regulation see Zeff et al., 1992). That regulation contained 
both mandatory  audit requirements and detailed disclosure rules, for all public 
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limited liability companies, for large private limited liability companies and for large 
cooperative  societies  (NIvRA,  1972).  A  second  major  increase  in  financial 
accounting regulation for firms occurred in 1984, with the number of firms subjected 
to a mandatory audit requirement increasing further, and more detailed disclosure 
rules being established (Burgert and Timmermans, 1987, pp. 29-30).  Both the 1971 
and 1984 regulations can be expected to increase the level of  expertise required to 
conduct an  audit, and could therefore  provide  a  potential  explanation for  the 
observed increase in levels of concentration. 
Two other effects of  the increased (regulatory) demand are worth noting. First, the 
number of lower skilled employees in the audit industry increased rapidly around the 
periods those regulations were introduced (see Maijoor, 1994). Hence, in the short 
term audit firms coped with the increased amount of  audit work by means of hiring 
employees at the assistant level. It takes a number of  years for those assistants to 
obtain their qualification as auditors. This might explain the increased growth of the 
total number of  (qualified) auditors at the end of  the 1980s depicted in  Figure 1. 
Second, as a result of  the increased amount of  audit work  there was increasing 
political pressure to enforce the requirement that the members of  NOvAA also 
received the right to provide audit services. With a delay, this right was granted to 
NOvAA members in 1993. 
Changes in technology, which increase the efficiency of  an audit firm, might have 
also increased the average firm size and therefore provide a potential explanation of 
the increase in concentration in the past two decades. A similar line of reasoning as 
for  financial  accounting  regulation  can  be  given  for  audit  technology.  The 
develoment  and  implementation  of  innovations  in  the  audit  process  require 
substantial sunk investments in staff. Only audit firms of  a minimum size level have 
the capacity to fund this sunk investment. In the past two decades, there have been a 
number of  significant changes in audit technology. These innovations include risk 
analysis, statistical sampling, and structured audit approaches (see Maijoor, 1994). 
Concerning client concentration, Benston (1985) hypothesized that large audit 
firms, relative to small audit firms, can more efficiently supply services to large client 
firms. In the audit market, one-to-one buyer-seller  relationships are common and 
there is hardly any subcontracting. One explanation for both phenomena is  that 
large clients, with numerous (inter)national branches, can only be serviced efficiently 
by large audit firms. DeAngelo (1981) provides another reason why only large audit 
firms can provide high-quality services to large clients. She argues that the larger a 
client’s share in the total client portfolio of  an auditor, the smaller is the chance that 
the  auditor can resist client pressure and maintain independence. Large clients 
demanding high-quality services -  because  of  a  high  degree  of  separation of 
ownership and control -would  only consider buying services from large audit firms. 
Hence, there are numbers of  reasons to expect that if  the size of  auditees increases, 
then the efficient size of audit firms will increase as well. 
There  is  only  limited systemic empirical evidence  on  the  long-term level  of 
concentration in Dutch industries. Casual observation indicates that after the Second 
World War and up until 1960 the level of industry concentration in the Netherlands 
was relatively stable (de Jong, 1988). During the 196Os, and especially towards the 
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end of that decade, there was a very substantial increase in the level of  concentration 
of  Dutch industry. For example, from 1965 to 1975 the annual number of  mergers 
and acquisitions in the Netherlands increased from about fifty in 1965 to 400 in 1974. 
This increase in client concentration can be a potential explanation for the increasing 
levels of  audit  market  concentration. Further,  empirical evidence  suggests that 
concentration in  Dutch  (client)  industries  is,  in  general,  higher  than  in  other 
countries (Bloemen et al., 1993, compare both U.K. and Dutch data). 
Entry Barriers 
The  economies  of  scale  explanation  given  above  assumes  a  competitive 
(contestable) market.  However, increasing  concentration may  also  follow  from 
reduced competition as a result of  increased barriers for potential competitors to 
enter an audit market (see, e.g., Dopuch and Simunic, 1980). The typical entry 
bamer for auditing services is the licensing regime. Licensing may make entry more 
costly, and may decrease the level of competition in the audit industry (Young, 1986). 
In  the Netherlands a licensing regime for auditors was  first introduced in  1967 
(Hulshoff Pol, 1988). As a result of  this regime, only a monopolist -  NIvRA -  has 
the right to license auditors. Before 1967 there was only a certification regime:  and 
certification was conducted by a number of  auditor associations. 
The establishment of  a licensing regime does not, however, seem to have caused 
higher entry barriers and, as  a result, higher concentration. Under the licensing 
regime, net entry into the Dutch market has been substantial,  and on average higher 
than in the pre-licensing period. Especially in the last decade net entry into the audit 
market has been high (see Table 4 for the years 1980 to 1990). The fact that many 
firms entered the market negates the idea of  a substantial entry barrier. Perhaps this 
is because, while there is a licensing regime, there are still many opportunities to 
obtain a licence. There is a large number of educational routes. Apparently, there are 
no  substantial barriers  to  start  a  (small)  audit  firm.  Hence, concentration  has 
increased despite substantial entry in the last decade. 
Mergers of International Networks 
The third explanation for changes in  the concentration levels in (national) audit 
markets is the incidence of  mergers of  international networks (see, e.g., Christiansen 
and Loft, 1992, Loft  and Sjofors, 1993). If  that explanation holds, the increasing 
concentration would not be related to changes in the national audit market, but be 
more or less an exogenous effect as a result of  a decision made at an international 
level. 
An  analysis of  mergers  where  audit  firms  were  involved  with  international 
networks shows that this explanation is valid for the increase in concentration at the 
end of  the  '80s. The merger between Peat Marwick and KMG in 1986, and that 
between Arthur Young and Ernst & Whinney in 1989, are apposite. Both mergers 
Young (1986) describes certification and licensing as follows. Certification does not prevent anyone 
from supplying audit services, but the use of  particular titles in the market is limited to persons who 
have a certificate. Licensing prohibits the supply of audit services without a licence. 
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were followed by their Dutch counterparts. However, it should be noted that not all 
international  mergers are implemented on  a  national  level.  In  the  case of  the 
international merger of  Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Touche Ross in  1989, the 
Dutch counterparts of  Deloitte (Deloitte Dijker van  Dien) did not  support the 
international merger, preferring to quit the network (Sluyterman, 1993, p. 108). It 
should be noted that the international network explanation is not relevant for the 
increase in concentration at the beginning of the '70s. That increase was the result of 
large audit firms, which were in a number of  cases affiliated with an international 
network, acquiring smaller audit firms without an international affiliation. 
In sum, the increase in  the level of  concentration in the Dutch audit market 
occurred during a period of  time in which: (a) financial accounting regulation was 
introduced, (b) there were rapid changes in audit technology, (c) a licensing regime 
for auditors was initiated, (d) client concentration increased, and (e) there were a 
number of  mergers of  international networks. Supply-side  regulation, in the form of 
a licensing regime, does not seem to be an important variable explaining the increase 
in audit market concentration. However, further research and stronger evidence is 
needed to assess whether the other variables caused the increase in the level of 
concentration. 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
The main purposes of this article are: (a) to show how auditor association member- 
ship lists can be used to create a longitudinal data base on the number and size of 
firms in an audit market; (b) to illustrate how these data can be exploited for audit 
market  research  issues,  in  this  case  the  calculation  of  the  level  of  supplier 
concentration; and (c) to give possible explanations for observed changes in the level 
of  supplier concentration. The results for the supply side of  the Dutch audit market 
show concentration levels that are low and stable for a long period. Only in the past 
two  decades  have  concentration  levels  increased  substantially. This  increasing 
concentration coincides with increasing regulation of the demand and supply side of 
the Dutch audit market, increasing technological complexity of  the audit process, 
increasing client concentration, and the mergers of  international networks. However, 
supply-side regulation does not seem to be a major factor contributing to the high 
concentration levels. Concentration has increased despite higher levels of entry into 
the audit market. Further research is needed to assess whether financial statement 
regulation, audit technology and client concentration caused these changes in the 
level of concentration. 
The data in this article can also be used for a large number of other audit (market) 
research issues. One example is the demand for auditing. The data give an indication 
of the development of  the total size of  the audit market in the past century. Hence, 
they can be used in tests of  explanations of  the demand for auditing. Potential 
variables for explaining changes in the size of the audit market are: (a) the growth of 
firms  with  a  high  degree of  separation of  ownership and control,  and  (b) the 
enforcement of  government regulations that require auditor's  services. The first 
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variable can be proxied by the number of  listed corporations, and the second by a 
careful review of  the Dutch history of (financial) regulation (see Buijink et al., 1993). 
A second audit (market) research issue that may benefit from the membership list 
data is understanding what constitutes successful growth strategies of audit firms. In 
the past century a number of  small audit firms managed to grow and acquire a 
substantial share of  the market. Other small audit firms failed to grow and even 
exited from the audit market in an early stage. Two potential key explanatory factors 
are reflected in  the following questions: (a) does an audit firm have an internal 
growth strategy, or a merger and acquisition growth strategy; and (b) does the audit 
firm have an extensive national and international audit firm network? Data on the 
first factor can be retrieved directly from the membership lists. Concerning the 
second factor, most Dutch membership lists provide data on the number of offices of 
audit  firms, including their  geographical dispersion, and  reveal  information  on 
whether the audit firms have an international network. Combining this information 
with the data in this article provides the opportunity to test the two suggested 
explanations of successful growth strategies of audit firms. 
Finally, data in this article are especially interesting given that membership lists are 
available  in  other  countries  as  well,  thus  providing  many  opportunities  for 
comparative research. For example, further work could analyse whether increasing 
regulation  in  other  countries  is  also  associated  with  increasing  levels  of 
concentration. This would provide more insight into regulation as an explanatory 
variable of audit market structure. 
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APPENDIX A 
GENEALOGY OF THE DUTCH AUDITOR ASSOCIATION NIvRA AND 
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Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants 
Nederlandsch College van Accountants 
Nederlandsch Genootschap van Accountants 
Nederlandsch Instituut van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Academie van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Accountants Associatie 
Nederlandsche Accountants Vereeniging 
Nederlandsche Associatie van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Bond van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Broederschap van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Organisatie van Accountants 
Nederlandsche Unie van Accountants 
Vereeniging van Nederlandsche  Accountants 
Vereniging  van Academisch Gevormde Accountants 
Note. Only branches of auditor associations which merged into the present day NIvRA are included. 
Of each auditor association the date of establishment (E) and date of  merger (M) are given. 
In case of  a merger of  auditor associations, the name of  the new auditor association is only used if  it 
differs from the name of the largest previous auditor association. 
APPENDIX B 
AVAILABLE AND MISSING DATA 
The available and estimated missing data for the 1880-1966  period in terms of  both the number of 
auditors and the number of firms. 
Year  No. (YO) auditors  NO.  (Yo)  of  NO.  (%)  firms  NO.  (Yo) of 












































1  (100%) 
2 (100%) 
2 (100%) 




















31 (39%) DUTCH AUDIT CONCENTRATION 
Appendix B (cont.) 
Year  No. (%) auditors  NO.  (Yo)  Of  No. (%) firms  NO.  (Yo)  Of 


































































40  (25%) 

























































































The methods by which the numbers are calculated differ from period to period and are explained in 
Buijink et af. (1993). Here the remarks on the collection  process made in the main text suffice. Note that 
the membership lists of the post-1966 monopolist NIvRA cover the complete audit market. 
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